Monitoring Intensity and Technology Choice in A Model of Unemployment by Zhou, Haiwen
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Monitoring Intensity and Technology
Choice in A Model of Unemployment
Haiwen Zhou
1 March 2019
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/92494/
MPRA Paper No. 92494, posted 2 March 2019 05:43 UTC
1 
 
Monitoring Intensity and Technology Choice 
in A Model of Unemployment 
 
Haiwen Zhou 
 
Abstract 
 The interaction among a firm’s choices of output, technology, and monitoring intensity is 
studied in a general equilibrium model. Firms engage in oligopolistic competition and 
unemployment is a result of the existence of efficiency wages. The following results are derived 
analytically. First, an increase in the cost of exerting effort leads a firm to choose a more advanced 
technology and a lower level of monitoring intensity. Second, an increase in the discount rate does 
not change a firm’s choices of technology and monitoring intensity. Third, an increase in the 
elasticity of substitution among goods leads a firm to choose higher levels of monitoring intensity 
and technology. In a model in which the level of monitoring is exogenously given, there is a 
negative relationship between the wage rate and the monitoring intensity. In this model with 
endogenously chosen monitoring intensity, the wage rate and the monitoring intensity can move 
either in the same direction or in opposite directions. 
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1. Introduction 
In their seminal paper on unemployment, Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) have demonstrated 
the existence of equilibrium unemployment. In their model, a worker chooses whether to exert 
effort or to shirk. A worker will shirk if the lifetime utility from shirking is higher than that from 
not shirking. One interesting result that Shapiro and Stiglitz establish is the existence of a negative 
relationship between the level of monitoring and the wage rate. Researchers have conducted 
empirical and experimental studies to test this negative relationship. First, Groshen and Krueger 
(1990) have demonstrated that the wages of nurses tend to fall with the extent of supervision, 
consistent with the efficiency wage theory. Second, in his study of contractual workers in the 
petrochemical industry, Rebitzer (1995) has shown that high levels of supervision are associated 
with lower wage levels, supporting the efficiency wage theory. Finally, in their experimental study 
of telephone call centers in which callers solicit donations, Nagin et al. (2002) have found that a 
significant ratio of workers cheat (shirk) when monitoring intensities of potential cheating 
decrease. However, there are empirical studies such as Neal (1993) failing to find the negative 
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relationship between monitoring and pay. The efficiency wage approach has been challenged on 
this inconsistency between theory and empirical evidence. 
The inconsistency between theory and some evidence motivates the incorporation of 
endogenous monitoring intensity into the efficiency wage approach of unemployment. In Shapiro 
and Stiglitz (1984), the possibility that shirking is detected is assumed to be exogenously given. In 
concluding their paper, they have discussed a firm’s choice of monitoring intensity as a 
generalization of their model. In reality, as shown in time clocks and spot checks, firms choose 
monitoring intensities and spend significant amounts of resources in preventing shirking (Dickens 
et al., 1989). A higher level of monitoring by the firm can increase the probability that a worker’s 
shirking is detected. Suppose the wage rate of a firm is exogenously given due to the existence of 
unions or government regulations. This exogenous wage rate may not be the optimal one to prevent 
shirking. Then having the choice of monitoring intensity can be valuable to this firm. A model of 
endogenous choice of monitoring intensity will be helpful to understand how monitoring 
intensities are affected by more fundamental parameters, such as the discount rate of an individual. 
If a firm can choose its monitoring intensity, it can also choose other aspects of its 
operation, such as the levels of technology and output. Prendergast (1990) shows that it is feasible 
for firms to choose technologies. He also shows that a firm’s choice of technology is affected by 
its level of output: a higher level of output induces a firm to choose a technology with a higher 
fixed cost but a lower marginal cost of production. 
In this paper, we study a firm’s choices of monitoring intensity, technology, and output in 
a general equilibrium model. Similar to Neary (2003, 2016), Qiu and Zhou (2007), and Liu and 
Wang (2010), firms engage in oligopolistic competition.1 There is a continuum of goods. Capital 
and labor are the two factors of production. To produce each good, there is a continuum of 
technologies with different levels of fixed and marginal costs of production. A more advanced 
technology has a higher fixed cost but a lower marginal cost of production. Unemployment is a 
result of the existence of efficiency wages (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984).  
We show that an increase in the cost of exerting effort leads a firm to choose a more 
advanced technology, a lower level of monitoring intensity, and the equilibrium wage rate 
                                                 
1 The importance of oligopoly in a modern society is illustrated in Chandler (1990). The Second Industrial Revolution 
occurred in the United States near the end of the 19th century and the start of the 20th century. During that period, with 
increasing returns in production, management, and distribution, important industries such as the steel industry began 
to be dominated by oligopolistic firms. 
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increases. When the amount of capital increases, a firm chooses a higher level of monitoring 
intensity, and the equilibrium wage rate also increases. Thus, monitoring intensity and the wage 
rate can move either in the same direction or in opposite directions when the level of monitoring 
intensity is endogenously chosen. This is different from the negative relationship between 
monitoring intensity and the wage rate when the level of monitoring is exogenously given. That 
is, the incorporation of endogenous monitoring intensity helps explain empirical evidence (Goerke, 
2001; Allgulin and Ellingsen, 2002). 
As discussed in Neary (2003, 2016) and Ruffin (2003), there are some potential difficulties 
of incorporating oligopoly into a general equilibrium model. One difficulty is that a firm engaging 
in oligopolistic competition may have market power in both the product market and the labor 
market. The determination of the wage rate may not be straightforward when a firm has market 
power in the labor market. Neary (2003, 2016) has proposed the incorporation of a continuum of 
goods to eliminate a firm’s market power in the labor market, which is assumed in this paper. In 
this paper, while a firm has market power in the product market and can influence the wage rate 
through its choice of monitoring intensity, this firm has to take the price index and the 
unemployment rate as given. Thus, the wage rate is determined through the non-shirking condition 
for a worker. This assumption that firms have different degrees of market power in different 
markets is like the “semi-small” open economy assumption discussed in Turnovsky (2000, p. 358) 
under which a country is assumed to be small in the international asset market and in the market 
for its imported goods. However, this country is assumed to have market power in the market for 
its export goods. 
The pioneering work of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) has started a long line of literature. For 
example, Kimball (1994) has addressed out-of-the-steady-state dynamics of the efficiency wage 
models. Davis and Harrigan (2011) have studied a model of international trade in which firms 
engage in monopolistic competition and firms differ in their monitoring intensities. A firm’s 
choices of technology and monitoring intensity are not examined in those models. Goerke (2001) 
and Allgulin and Ellingsen (2002) have considered a firm’s choice of monitoring intensity. There 
are some significant differences between their models and this one. First, their models do not focus 
on equilibrium unemployment. Second, technology choice is not addressed in their models. 
This paper is related to models on technology choice, such as Zhou (2004, 2009, 2015). 
Zhou (2004) provides a formal analysis of the mutual dependence between the division of labor 
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and the extent of the market in a general equilibrium model. Zhou (2009) studies the impact of 
population growth on the possibility of industrialization in a dynamic model. One essential 
difference between this paper and Zhou (2004, 2009) is that unemployment and monitoring 
intensity are not modeled in Zhou (2004, 2009). Zhou (2015) shows that a higher level of capital 
stock may not reduce the unemployment rate. One important difference between this paper and 
Zhou (2015) is that monitoring intensity is endogenously chosen in this model while it is 
exogenously given in Zhou (2015). 
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 specifies the model and establishes the 
equilibrium conditions for a steady state. Section 3 establishes the existence of a unique 
equilibrium and conducts comparative statics to explore the properties of the steady state. Section 
4 discusses some potential generalizations and extensions of the model and concludes. The 
Appendix contains alternative proofs of some results and provides some additional results not 
proved in the text. 
 
2. The model 
Time is continuous. There is a continuum of goods indexed by 𝜛 ∈ [0, 1]. All goods have 
the same costs of production and they enter a consumer’s utility function in a symmetric way.2 
The amount of capital is 𝐾, which is exogenously given and does not change over time. The 
interest rate is 𝑟. Capital is owned equally by all individuals and each individual receives 𝜂 from 
owning capital, which will be determined endogenously. The wage rate is 𝑤  and the 
unemployment rate is 𝑢. The size of the population is 𝐿 and it does not change over time.  
 
2.1. Individual behavior 
Each individual may supply one unit of labor if not shirking. An individual’s income is 𝐼. 
For an employed individual, the level of income is the sum of wage income and return from owing 
capital: 𝐼 = 𝑤 + 𝜂. For an unemployed individual, the level of income is the return from owing 
capital: 𝐼 = 𝜂. 
The price of good 𝜛  is 𝑝(𝜛).  An individual’s consumption of good 𝜛  is 𝑐(𝜛) . A 
consumer’s budget constraint is 
                                                 
2 Similar to Neary (2003, 2016), the purpose of assuming a continuum of goods rather than one good is to make sure 
that a firm treats the price index as given. 
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∫ 𝑝ଵ଴ (𝜛)𝑐(𝜛)𝑑𝜛 = 𝐼.           (1) 
An individual’s discount rate is 𝜌 and the cost of exerting effort is 𝑒. For the constant 0 <
𝛼 < 1, a consumer’s utility function is specified as 
∫ 𝑈(𝑡)𝑒ିఘ௧𝑑𝑡ஶ଴ , 
    𝑈(𝑡) = ቂ∫ 𝑐(𝜛)ఈ𝑑𝜛ଵ଴ ቃ
ଵ/ఈ
− 𝑠𝑒.           (2) 
 If an individual exerts effort, 𝑠 is equal to one; otherwise, it is equal to zero. For 𝜎 ≡ ଵ
ଵିఈ
, 
let 𝑃 denote the price index: 𝑃 ≡ ቂ∫ 𝑝(𝜛)ଵିఙ𝑑𝜛ଵ଴ ቃ
ଵ/(ଵିఙ)
. Then from the specification of the 
utility function in equation (2), 𝑈(𝑡) = ூ
௉
− 𝑠𝑒. From the specification of the utility function, the 
absolute value of the elasticity of demand for a good is 𝜎. 
If an individual shirks, the probability that shirking is detected is 𝑞 , which is chosen 
optimally by a firm. The cost of monitoring in terms of the amount of capital used is ఏ
ଶ
𝑞ଶ, where 
𝜃 is a positive constant. A higher spending on monitoring will increase the probability that shirking 
is detected. If a worker is found shirking, this worker is fired. 
The exogenous job separation rate for a worker is 𝑏. For a shirker, the asset equation is 
given by 
𝜌𝑉ாௌ = 𝑈(𝑤 + 𝜂) + (𝑏 + 𝑞)(𝑉௨ − 𝑉ாௌ). 
Rearrangement of this equation yields 
     𝑉ாௌ =
௎(௪ାఎ)ା(௕ା௤)௏ೠ
ఘା௕ା௤
.            (3) 
 The asset equation for a non-shirker is given by 
𝜌𝑉ாே = 𝑈(𝑤 + 𝜂) − 𝑒 + 𝑏(𝑉௨ − 𝑉ாே). 
Rearrangement of this equation yields 
     𝑉ாே =
௎(௪ାఎ)ି௘ା௕௏ೠ
ఘା௕
.            (4) 
 An individual will not shirk if the lifetime utility of a shirker is smaller than that for a non-
shirker. From equations (3) and (4), the non-shirking condition is 
     𝑈(𝑤 + 𝜂) ≥ 𝜌𝑉௨ +
(ఘା௕ା௤)௘
௤
.           (5) 
For an unemployed individual, the probability per unit time of acquiring a job is 𝑎, which 
is endogenously determined. The asset equation for an unemployed individual is  
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     𝜌𝑉௨ = 𝑈(𝜂) + 𝑎(max [𝑉ாே , 𝑉ாௌ] − 𝑉௨).         (6) 
 In equilibrium, max[𝑉ாே , 𝑉ாௌ] = 𝑉ாே. Plugging equation (4) into equation (6) yields 
     𝜌𝑉௨ =
௔[௎(௪ାఎ)ି௘]ା(ఘା௕)௎(ఎ)
௔ା௕ାఘ
.           (7) 
Plugging equation (7) into (5), the non-shirking condition becomes 
𝑈(𝑤 + 𝜂) ≥ ௔[௎(௪ାఎ)ି௘]ା(ఘା௕)௎(ఎ)
௔ା௕ାఘ
+ (ఘା௕ା௤)௘
௤
. 
In equilibrium, the above relationship will hold with equality. With the utility function 
specified in equation (2), the non-shirking condition changes to 
௪ାఎ
௉
=
௔ቀೢశആು ି௘ቁା(ఘା௕)
ആ
ು
௔ା௕ାఘ
+ (ఘା௕ା௤)௘
௤
. 
As will be discussed in detail later, each good is produced by 𝑚 firms and each firm 
produces 𝑥  units of output at a marginal cost of 𝛽  units of labor. Thus, total employment is 
∫ 𝑚ଵ଴ (𝜛)𝛽𝑥(𝜛)𝑑𝜛. With a job separation rate of 𝑏, the flow into the unemployment pool is 
𝑏 ∫ 𝑚ଵ଴ (𝜛)𝛽𝑥(𝜛)𝑑𝜛. With a job acquisition rate 𝑎, the flow out is 𝑎(𝐿 − ∫ 𝑚
ଵ
଴ (𝜛)𝛽𝑥(𝜛)𝑑𝜛). 
Since time is continuous, the change in unemployment rate is  
?̇? = ଵ
௅
ቄ𝑏 ∫ 𝑚ଵ଴ (𝜛)𝛽𝑥(𝜛)𝑑𝜛 − 𝑎[𝐿 − ∫ 𝑚
ଵ
଴ (𝜛)𝛽𝑥(𝜛)𝑑𝜛]ቅ. 
 In a steady state, there is no change in unemployment rate: ?̇? = 0 . Thus, 𝑎 =
𝑏 ∫
௠భబ (ధ)ఉ௫(ధ)ௗధ
௅ି∫ ௠భబ (ధ)ఉ௫(ధ)ௗధ
. From equation (12) later, 𝑎 = 𝑏 ଵି௨
௨
. Plugging this value of 𝑎 into the non-
shirking condition, the non-shirking condition becomes3 
     ௪
௉
= 𝑒 + ௘
௤
ቀ௕
௨
+ 𝜌ቁ.            (8) 
 
2.2. Firm behavior 
 Since the price index is determined by prices of a continuum of goods and a firm produces 
only one good, a firm takes the price index as given. Firms producing the same good engage in 
Cournot competition. The number of identical firms producing good 𝜛  is 𝑚(𝜛) . Like Zhou 
(2004), Wen and Zhou (2012), and Gong and Zhou (2014), to produce each good, there is a 
continuum of technologies indexed by 𝑛 > 0. A higher value of 𝑛 indicates a more advanced 
                                                 
3 To emphasize the wage rate is the equilibrium value, we may add an asterisk mark over this variable. That is, we 
may use 𝑤∗ instead of 𝑤 in equation (8). 
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technology. For technology 𝑛, the level of fixed cost in terms of the amount of capital used is 𝑓(𝑛) 
and the level of marginal cost in terms of the amount of labor used is 𝛽(𝑛). A more advanced 
technology has a higher fixed cost but a lower marginal cost of production: 𝑓ᇱ(𝑛) > 0  and 
𝛽ᇱ(𝑛) < 0.4 When a firm’s level of output is 𝑥, this firm’s total revenue is 𝑝𝑥, cost of capital is 
ఏ
ଶ
𝑞ଶ𝑟 + 𝑓(𝑛)𝑟, and labor cost is 𝛽(𝑛)𝑥𝑤(𝑞). Thus, a firm’s profit is  
𝑝𝑥 − ఏ
ଶ
𝑞ଶ𝑟 − 𝑓(𝑛)𝑟 − 𝛽(𝑛)𝑥𝑤(𝑞). 
A firm takes the unemployment rate and other firms’ output as given and chooses its output, 
technology, and monitoring intensity optimally to maximize its profit. 5  First, the first order 
condition for a firm’s optimal choice of output 𝑥 is  
𝑥 + 𝑝 డ௫
డ௣
− 𝛽𝑤 = 0. 
Since a firm takes other firms’ output as given in a Cournot competition and the absolute value of 
the elasticity of demand of a consumer is 𝜎, this optimal choice of output leads to marginal revenue 
equals marginal cost: 
     𝑝 ቀ1 − ଵ
௠ఙ
ቁ = 𝛽𝑤.            (9) 
 For equation (9), when the number of firms is one (𝑚 = 1), this equation degenerates to 
𝑝 ቀ1 − ଵ
ఙ
ቁ = 𝛽𝑤, which is commonly seen in models of monopolistic competition. 
 Second, the first order condition for a firm’s optimal choice of technology 𝑛 requires that 
     −𝑓ᇱ(𝑛)𝑟 − 𝛽ᇱ(𝑛)𝑥𝑤(𝑞) = 0.        (10) 
 Equation (10) shows that a firm’s choice of technology is affected by its level of output. 
Other things equal, a higher level of output will induce a firm to choose a more advanced 
technology because the higher fixed cost can be spread to a higher level of output and thus the 
average cost is lower. 
 Third, the first order condition for a firm’s optimal choice of monitoring intensity 𝑞 
requires that 
     −𝜃𝑞𝑟 + ఉ௫௘
௤మ
ቀ௕
௨
+ 𝜌ቁ = 0.         (11) 
                                                 
4 To make sure that the second order condition for the optimal choice of technology is satisfied, we also assume that 
𝑓′′(𝑛) ≥ 0 and 𝛽′′(𝑛) ≥ 0. 
5 When a firm chooses its monitoring intensity and technology, this firm does not take strategic impact on other firms’ 
output into consideration. This is consistent with the "open loop" approach in the R&D literature when firms engage 
in oligopolistic competition, as studied in Vives (2008).  
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The second order condition for a firm’s optimal choice of monitoring intensity is always 
satisfied. Equation (11) shows the tradeoff faced by a firm in choosing monitoring intensity. The 
marginal cost from choosing a higher level of monitoring is a higher level of capital used for 
monitoring. The marginal benefit is that the wage rate is lower. That is, a firm takes the impact of 
monitoring intensity on the wage rate into consideration (as shown in equation (8)) when choosing 
monitoring intensity. 
Equations (10) and (11) can be used to demonstrate the interaction between choices of 
technology and monitoring intensity. When two decisions mutually reinforce one another, they 
may be called “strategic complements”. When two decisions mutually offset one another, they 
may be called “strategic substitutes” (Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer, 1985). Partial 
differentiation of equation (10) with respect to 𝑞 or partial differentiation of equation (11) with 
respect to 𝑛, the resulting cross derivatives are negative. Since the cross derivatives with respect 
to the profit function are negative, choices of technology and monitoring intensity are “strategic 
substitutes”. However, with firms engaging in oligopolistic competition, there are other effects 
affecting the choices of technology and monitoring intensity. Thus, a firm’s choice of technology 
and choice of monitoring intensity may not always move in opposite directions. 
 
2.3. Market clearing conditions 
For the labor market, each firm demands 𝛽𝑥 units of labor and total demand for labor of 
this economy is ∫ 𝑚ଵ଴ (𝜛)𝛽𝑥(𝜛)𝑑𝜛 . Effective supply of labor of this economy is (1 − 𝑢)𝐿 . 
Equilibrium in the labor market requires that 
    ∫ 𝑚ଵ଴ (𝜛)𝛽𝑥(𝜛)𝑑𝜛 = (1 − 𝑢)𝐿.        (12) 
For the market for capital, each firm demands 𝑓 + ఏ௤
మ
ଶ
 units of capital and total demand for 
capital of this economy is ∫ 𝑚ଵ଴ (𝜛) ቀ𝑓 +
ఏ௤మ
ଶ
ቁ 𝑑𝜛. Total supply of capital of this economy is 𝐾. 
The clearance of the market for capital requires that 
    ∫ 𝑚ଵ଴ (𝜛) ቀ𝑓 +
ఏ௤మ
ଶ
ቁ 𝑑𝜛 = 𝐾.         (13) 
Total income for all individuals from owning capital is 𝜂𝐿 and total return to capital in this 
economy is 𝑟𝐾. In equilibrium, they should be equal:  
    𝜂𝐿 = 𝑟𝐾.           (14) 
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 For the market for goods, total demand for goods from all consumers is 𝜂𝐿 + (1 − 𝑢)𝑤𝐿 
and total value of output is ∫ 𝑝ଵ଴ (𝜛)𝑚(𝜛)𝑥(𝜛)𝑑𝜛. The clearance of the market for goods requires 
that 
    𝜂𝐿 + (1 − 𝑢)𝑤𝐿 = ∫ 𝑝ଵ଴ (𝜛)𝑚(𝜛)𝑥(𝜛)𝑑𝜛.       (15) 
In this model, the number of firms producing a good is a real number rather than restricted 
to be an integer. In equilibrium, the number of firms producing a good is determined by the zero-
profit condition.6 The zero-profit condition requires that 
     𝑝𝑥 − ቀ𝑓 + ఏ
ଶ
𝑞ଶቁ 𝑟 − 𝛽𝑥𝑤 = 0.        (16) 
We focus on a symmetric equilibrium in which all goods have the same production 
technology, monitoring intensity, and price. Also, the number of firms producing each good and 
the level of output of each firm are the same. Since the total measure of goods is one, for simplicity, 
we drop the integration operator in a symmetric equilibrium. In a steady state, equations (8)-(16) 
form a system of nine equations defining a system of nine variables 𝑝, 𝑥, 𝑚, 𝑛, 𝑤, 𝑢, 𝑞, 𝜂 and 𝑟 as 
functions of exogenous parameters.7 A steady state is a tuple (𝑝, 𝑥, 𝑚, 𝑛, 𝑤, 𝑢, 𝑞, 𝜂, 𝑟) satisfying 
equations (8)-(16). For the rest of the paper, a representative good is used as the numeraire:  
𝑝 ≡ 1. 
Since the price of a representative good is normalized to one and all goods with a total 
measure of one have the same price, the price index will equal to one. Thus, equation (8) simplifies 
to 
     𝑤 = 𝑒 + ௘
௤
ቀ௕
௨
+ 𝜌ቁ.          (17) 
 
3. Comparative statics 
In this section, we study properties of the steady state. From equation (9), 𝑚 =
1/[𝜎(1 − 𝛽𝑤)]. Plugging this value of 𝑚 into equation (13) yields  
𝑓 + ఏ
ଶ
𝑞ଶ = (1 − 𝛽𝑤)𝜎𝐾.         (18) 
                                                 
6 For examples that firms engage in Cournot competition with free entry, see Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980), Zhang 
(2007), and Liu and Wang (2010). 
7 When equations (8)-(14) and (16) are satisfied, equation (15) is automatically satisfied. That is, one equation is 
redundant. This redundancy is consistent with Walras’s law.  
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The system of equations (8)-(16) defining the steady state is reduced to the following 
system of three equations defining three endogenous variables 𝑢 , 𝑛 , and 𝑞  as functions of 
exogenous parameters:8 
   𝛤ଵ ≡ 𝛽𝑒𝜎𝐾 ቀ
௕
௨
+ 𝜌ቁ − 𝜃𝑞ଷ = 0,       (19a) 
   𝛤ଶ ≡ −𝑓ᇱ𝛽 − 𝛽′ ቀ𝜎𝐾 − 𝑓 −
ఏ
ଶ
𝑞ଶቁ = 0,      (19b) 
   𝛤ଷ ≡
ଵ
ఉ
− 𝑒 −
௙ାయഇ೜
మ
మ
ఉఙ௄
= 0.        (19c) 
Partial differentiation of equations (19a)-(19c) with respect to 𝑢, 𝑛, 𝑞, 𝜌, 𝐾, 𝜃 and 𝑒 yields 
⎝
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎛
𝜕𝛤ଵ
𝜕𝑢
  
𝜕𝛤ଵ
𝜕𝑛
  
𝜕𝛤ଵ
𝜕𝑞
  0   
𝜕𝛤ଶ
𝜕𝑛
  
𝜕𝛤ଶ
𝜕𝑞
  0   
𝜕𝛤ଷ
𝜕𝑛
  
𝜕𝛤ଷ
𝜕𝑞 ⎠
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎞
൭
𝑑𝑢
𝑑𝑛
𝑑𝑞
൱ = − ൮
𝜕𝛤ଵ
𝜕𝜌
0
0
൲ 𝑑𝜌 −
⎝
⎜
⎜
⎛
𝜕𝛤ଵ
𝜕𝐾
𝜕𝛤ଶ
𝜕𝐾
𝜕𝛤ଷ
𝜕𝐾⎠
⎟
⎟
⎞
𝑑𝐾 
−
⎝
⎜
⎛
డ௰భ
డఏ
డ௰మ
డఏ
డ௰య
డఏ ⎠
⎟
⎞
𝑑𝜃 − ൮
డ௰భ
డ௘
0
డ௰య
డ௘
൲ 𝑑𝑒 −
⎝
⎜
⎛
డ௰భ
డఙ
డ௰మ
డఙ
డ௰య
డఙ ⎠
⎟
⎞
𝑑𝜎.        (20) 
Partial differentiation of equations (19a)-(19c) reveals that డ௰భ
డ௨
< 0, డ௰మ
డ௡
< 0, డ௰మ
డ௤
< 0, డ௰య
డ௤
<
0 , and డ௰య
డ௡
> 0 . Thus, the determinant of the coefficient matrix of (20) is negative: 𝛥 ≡
డ௰భ
డ௨
ቀడ௰మ
డ௡
డ௰య
డ௤
− డ௰మ
డ௤
డ௰య
డ௡
ቁ < 0. With 𝛥 nonsingular, a unique equilibrium exists (Turnovsky, 1977, 
chap. 2). We thus proceed to explore properties of the steady state. While we may expect there is 
no monotonic relationship between monitoring intensity and the wage rate when the level of 
monitoring is endogenously chosen, what are the circumstances that the two variables move in the 
                                                 
8  The derivation of equations (19a)-(19c) is as follows. First, from equation (16), 𝑟 = 𝑥(1 − 𝛽𝑤)/(𝑓 + ఏ
ଶ
𝑞ଶ) . 
Plugging this value of 𝑟 into equation (16) yields 𝛽𝑒 ቀ௕
௨
+ 𝜌ቁ ቀ𝑓 + ఏ
ଶ
𝑞ଶቁ − 𝜃(1 − 𝛽𝑤)𝑞ଷ = 0. Plugging equation (18) 
into this equation yields equation (19a). Second, plugging 𝑟 = 𝑥(1 − 𝛽𝑤)/(𝑓 + ఏ
ଶ
𝑞ଶ)  into equation (10) yields 
𝑓ᇱ(1 − 𝛽𝑤) + 𝛽ᇱ𝑤 ቀ𝑓 + ఏ
ଶ
𝑞ଶቁ = 0. Plugging the value of 𝑤 from equation (18) into this equation yields equation 
(19b). Third, plugging the value of 𝑤 from 𝑓 + ఏ
ଶ
𝑞ଶ = (1 − 𝛽𝑤)𝜎𝐾 into equation (17) yields ଵ
ఉ
− 𝑒 − ௘
௤
ቀ௕
௨
+ 𝜌ቁ −
௙ାഇమ௤
మ
ఉఙ௄
= 0. Plugging equation (18) into this equation yields equation (19c).  
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same or opposite directions? To answer this question, we need to study how various parameters 
affect the monitoring intensity and the wage rate. 
Technological progress such as development of the internet can change the level of 
monitoring costs. An increase in 𝜃  means that the level of monitoring costs increases. The 
following proposition studies the impact of an increase in the level of monitoring costs on the 
equilibrium level of monitoring intensity. 
 
Proposition 1: An increase in the level of monitoring costs leads a firm to choose a lower 
level of monitoring intensity. 
Proof: Applying Cramer’s rule to equation (20) yields 
   ௗ௤
ௗఏ
= డ௰భ
డ௨
ቀడ௰మ
డఏ
డ௰య
డ௡
− డ௰మ
డ௡
డ௰య
డఏ
ቁ 𝛥 < 0⁄ . ∎ 
 
Proposition 1 is intuitive. An increase in the level of monitoring costs increases the 
marginal cost of choosing a higher monitoring intensity without changing the marginal benefit. 
Thus, the equilibrium level of monitoring decreases. From the Appendix, a change in the level of 
monitoring costs changes neither the equilibrium level of technology nor the wage rate. From 
equation (17), since the wage rate does not change and the monitoring intensity decreases, an 
increase in the level of monitoring costs will cause an increase in the equilibrium unemployment 
rate. 
An increase in the discount rate indicates an individual is less concerned with future. 
Individuals in different countries may have quite different discount rates as shown in the different 
saving rates among countries. How will difference in the discount rate affect the unemployment 
rate and levels of monitoring intensity and technology?9 
 
Proposition 2: An increase in the discount rate increases the unemployment rate and 
changes neither the level of technology nor the level of monitoring. 
Proof: Applying Cramer’s rule to equation (20) yields 
    ௗ௡
ௗఘ
= 0, 
                                                 
9 The impact of a change in the exogenous job separation rate is like that from a change in the discount rate and is not 
presented here. 
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    ௗ௤
ௗఘ
= 0, 
    ௗ௨
ௗఘ
= −
డ௰భ
డఘ
డ௰భ
డ௨
൙ > 0. ∎ 
 
The intuition behind Proposition 2 is as follows. From equation (10), the discount rate does 
not directly affect the marginal cost and marginal benefit of the choice of technology. The discount 
rate could affect the choice of technology indirectly through affecting variables such as the level 
of output and the interest rate. However, the level of output is positively related to the interest rate, 
and impact from those two variables on the level of technology work in opposite directions and 
cancel out. Overall, the equilibrium level of technology is not affected by a change in the discount 
rate. Similarly, neither the equilibrium monitoring intensity nor the equilibrium wage rate is 
affected by a change in the discount rate. 
 The following proposition studies the impact of an increase in the amount of capital on the 
levels of monitoring intensity and the equilibrium level of technology. 
 
 Proposition 3: An increase in the amount of capital leads a firm to choose higher levels of 
monitoring intensity and technology. 
 Proof: From equation (19c), 
௙ାయమఏ௤
మ
ఙ௄
< 1. Partial differentiation of equations (19b) and 
(19c) yields 
డ௰మ
డ௤
డ௰య
డ௄
− డ௰మ
డ௄
డ௰య
డ௤
= ఏ௤ఉ
ᇲ
ఉ௄
ቆ
௙ାయమఏ௤
మ
ఙ௄
− 3ቇ > 0. 
Applying Cramer’s rule to equation (20) yields 
    ௗ௤
ௗ௄
= డ௰భ
డ௨
ቀడ௰మ
డ௄
డ௰య
డ௡
− డ௰మ
డ௡
డ௰య
డ௄
ቁ 𝛥 > 0⁄ , 
ௗ௡
ௗ௄
= డ௰భ
డ௨
ቀడ௰మ
డ௤
డ௰య
డ௄
− డ௰మ
డ௄
డ௰య
డ௤
ቁ 𝛥 > 0⁄ . ∎ 
  
When the amount of capital increases, some of the increased capital is absorbed in choosing 
a higher level of technology and some is absorbed in choosing a higher level of monitoring 
intensity. In equilibrium, both the level of technology and the level of monitoring intensity 
increase. From the Appendix, the equilibrium wage rate increases when the amount of capital 
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increases. From equation (17), since both the wage rate and the monitoring intensity increase, the 
equilibrium unemployment rate decreases when the amount of capital increases. 
Proposition 3 can be used to illustrate some events in the process of the Industrial 
Revolution. Initially, merchants provided inputs and purchased outputs from independent 
producers. Later workers produced at factories. Workers were monitored more intensively than 
independent producers and factories use more advanced technologies. Using Proposition 3, those 
increases in the level of monitoring intensity and technology could be viewed as a result of capital 
accumulation at that time. 
The following proposition studies the impact of an increase in the cost of exerting effort 
on the level of technology, monitoring intensity, and the wage rate. 
 
 Proposition 4: An increase in the cost of exerting effort leads a firm to choose a lower level 
of monitoring intensity and a more advanced technology. In addition, the equilibrium wage rate 
increases. 
 Proof: Applying Cramer’s rule to equation (20) yields 
    ௗ௤
ௗ௘
= − డ௰భ
డ௨
డ௰మ
డ௡
డ௰య
డ௘
𝛥 < 0⁄ , 
    ௗ௡
ௗ௘
= డ௰భ
డ௨
డ௰మ
డ௤
డ௰య
డ௘
𝛥 > 0⁄ . 
 From equation (18), the wage rate can be expressed as 
𝑤 = ଵ
ఉ
ቆ1 −
௙ାഇమ௤
మ
ఙ௄
ቇ. 
 While 𝑒 does not show up in the above equation for the wage rate, 𝑒 can affect the wage 
rate through 𝑛 and 𝑞. Differentiation of this equation with respect to 𝑒 yields 
ௗ௪
ௗ௘
= − ቈ ௙
ᇲ
ఉఙ௄
+ ఉ
ᇲ
ఉమ
ቆ1 −
௙ାഇమ௤
మ
ఙ௄
ቇ቉ ௗ௡
ௗ௘
− ఏ௤
ఉఙ௄
ௗ௤
ௗ௘
. 
 From equation (19b), ௙
ᇲ
ఉఙ௄
+ ఉ
ᇲ
ఉమ
ቆ1 −
௙ାഇమ௤
మ
ఙ௄
ቇ = 0. Thus, ௗ௪
ௗ௘
= − ఏ௤
ఉఙ௄
ௗ௤
ௗ௘
> 0. ∎ 
 
 The intuition behind Proposition 4 is as follows. When the cost of exerting effort increases, 
monitoring intensity needs to decrease to make sure that the non-shirking condition remains valid. 
When the level of monitoring decreases, the wage rate increases. When a firm chooses a more 
advanced technology, the marginal benefit comes from saving of wage costs. A higher wage rate 
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increases a firm’s incentive to choose a more advanced technology because the saving from wage 
costs increases. Thus, equilibrium level of technology increases. Like the proof of Proposition 4, 
it can be shown that impact of a change in the cost of exerting effort on the unemployment rate is 
ambiguous. 
When 𝜎 increases, the elasticity of substitution among goods increases. The elasticity of 
substitution may be used to measure the degree of competition in an industry. Will a more 
competitive industry have a higher level of monitoring? The following proposition studies the 
impact of a change in the elasticity of substitution among goods on the levels of monitoring 
intensity and the equilibrium level of technology. 
 
 Proposition 5: An increase in the elasticity of substitution among goods leads a firm to 
choose higher levels of monitoring intensity and technology. 
 Proof: From equation (19c), 𝑓 + ଷ
ଶ
𝜃𝑞ଶ < 𝜎𝐾. Partial differentiation of equations (19b) and 
(19c) yields 
    డ௰మ
డ௤
డ௰య
డఙ
− డ௰మ
డఙ
డ௰య
డ௤
= ఏ௤ఉ
ᇲ
ఉ௄
ቆ
௙ାయమఏ௤
మ
ఙ௄
− 3ቇ > 0. 
Applying Cramer’s rule to equation (20) yields 
    ௗ௤
ௗఙ
= డ௰భ
డ௨
ቀడ௰మ
డఙ
డ௰య
డ௡
− డ௰మ
డ௡
డ௰య
డఙ
ቁ 𝛥 > 0⁄ , 
ௗ௡
ௗఙ
= డ௰భ
డ௨
ቀడ௰మ
డ௤
డ௰య
డఙ
− డ௰మ
డఙ
డ௰య
డ௤
ቁ 𝛥 > 0⁄ . ∎ 
 
 To understand Proposition 5, a firm’s choices of technology and monitoring intensity 
increase with the level of output. A higher elasticity of substitution among goods tends to increase 
a firm’s output, and equilibrium technology and monitoring intensity increase. From the Appendix, 
the equilibrium wage rate increases when the elasticity of substitution among goods increases. 
From equation (17), because both the wage rate and the monitoring rate increase, the equilibrium 
unemployment rate decreases when the elasticity of substitution among goods increases. 
It is interesting that the level of monitoring intensity and the level of technology are not 
affected by the population size. The reasoning is as follows. Population size does not affect the 
marginal cost and benefit of choices of technology and monitoring intensity directly. It could affect 
the choices of technology and monitoring intensity indirectly through affecting the level of output 
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and the interest rate. Because impact from those two variables cancel out, equilibrium levels of 
technology and monitoring intensity are not affected by population size.  
From the discussions after Propositions 1-5, when the monitoring intensity is endogenously 
chosen, the level of monitoring intensity and the wage rate can move either in the same direction 
or in opposite directions. Also, they can be unrelated. That is, there is no monotonic relationship 
between the monitoring intensity and the wage rate. This is different from the case that the wage 
rate decreases with the level of monitoring intensity when monitoring intensity is exogenously 
given. 
 
4. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have studied the interaction among a firm’s choices of output, technology, 
and monitoring intensity in a general equilibrium model. In this model, firms engage in 
oligopolistic competition and the existence of efficiency wages leads to unemployment. The model 
is tractable, and we have established the following results analytically. First, an increase in the 
amount of capital induces a firm to choose higher levels of monitoring intensity and technology, 
and the equilibrium wage rate increases. Second, an increase in the cost of exerting effort for a 
worker leads a firm to choose a more advanced technology and a lower level of monitoring 
intensity. Third, an increase in the discount rate of a consumer increases the unemployment rate 
and does not change the levels of technology and monitoring intensity. Finally, an increase in the 
level of monitoring cost or a decrease in the elasticity of substitution among goods leads a firm to 
choose a lower level of monitoring intensity and the equilibrium unemployment rate increases. 
There are some interesting generalizations and extensions of the model. First, in this model 
the amount of capital is exogenously given. To address how time preference affects unemployment 
rate, the model can be generalized to the case that the amount of capital is endogenously 
determined by saving. Second, in this model firms are homogenous in terms of monitoring 
intensity and marginal cost of production. To fit reality better, firm heterogeneity through 
difference in either monitoring intensity or marginal cost may be introduced into the model. 
Finally, this paper studies a closed economy. As shown in Brecher, Chen, and Yu (2013), the 
impact of trade on unemployment is an interesting issue. With the introduction of one additional 
sector of production, the model may be extended to study how a country’s comparative advantage 
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is affected by monitoring intensity and how the opening of international trade affects the 
monitoring intensity and the unemployment rate. 
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Appendix 
The system of equations (8)-(16) defining the steady state can be reduced alternatively into 
the following system of three equations defining three variables 𝑤 , 𝑛 , and 𝑞  as functions of 
exogenous parameters: 
𝛺ଵ ≡ 𝑓 +
ఏ
ଶ
𝑞ଶ − (1 − 𝛽𝑤)𝜎𝐾 = 0,        (A1) 
   𝛺ଶ ≡ −𝑓ᇱ − 𝛽′𝑤𝜎𝐾 = 0,         (A2) 
   𝛺ଷ ≡ 𝜃𝑞ଶ − 𝛽𝜎𝐾(𝑤 − 𝑒) = 0.        (A3) 
The derivation of equations (A1)-(A3) is as follows. First, equation (A1) is the same as 
equation (18). Second, equation (A2) is derived by plugging the value of 𝑟 from equation (16) and 
equation (18) into equation (10). Third, equation (A3) is derived by plugging the value of 𝑢 from 
equation (17) into equation (19a). 
 Partial differentiation of equations (A1)-(A3) yields 
⎝
⎜
⎛
డఆభ
డ௪
     0     డఆభ
డ௤
డఆమ
డ௪
    డఆమ
డ௡
    0  
డఆయ
డ௪
   డఆయ
డ௡
  డఆయ
డ௤ ⎠
⎟
⎞
൭
𝑑𝑤
𝑑𝑛
𝑑𝑞
൱ = −
⎝
⎜
⎛
డఆభ
డ௄
డఆమ
డ௄
డఆయ
డ௄ ⎠
⎟
⎞
𝑑𝐾 − ൮
డఆభ
డఏ
0
డఆయ
డఏ
൲ 𝑑𝜃 − ቌ
0
0
డఆయ
డ௘
ቍ 𝑑𝑒 −
⎝
⎜
⎛
డఆభ
డఙ
డఆమ
డఙ
డఆయ
డఙ ⎠
⎟
⎞
𝑑𝜎.     (A4) 
 Let 𝛥ఆ denote the determinant of the coefficient matrix of (A4). For stability, it is assumed 
that 𝛥ఆ < 0. Comparative statics results from (A4) are the same as those from (20). For example, 
applying Cramer’s rule to (A4) yields ௗ௪
ௗ௘
= డఆభ
డ௤
డఆమ
డ௡
డఆయ
డ௘
𝛥ఆ > 0ൗ . This result is the same as that in 
Proposition 4. However, the system (A4) can be used to derive the following additional results. 
Those results are not available from (20). 
Partial differentiation of (A1) and (A3) reveals that డఆభ
డ௤
డఆయ
డ௄
− డఆభ
డ௄
డఆయ
డ௤
= ଶ௤௙ఏ
௄
> 0. With 
డఆమ
డ௡
< 0 and డఆభ
డ௤
డఆమ
డ௄
డఆయ
డ௡
> 0, it is clear that డఆభ
డ௤
డఆమ
డ௡
డఆయ
డ௄
− డఆభ
డ௄
డఆమ
డ௡
డఆయ
డ௤
− డఆభ
డ௤
డఆమ
డ௄
డఆయ
డ௡
< 0. Partial 
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differentiation of equations (A1) and (A3) reveals that డఆభ
డ௤
డఆయ
డఙ
− డఆభ
డఙ
డఆయ
డ௤
= ଶ௙௤ఏ
ఙ
> 0. With డఆమ
డ௡
<
0  and డఆభ
డ௤
డఆమ
డఙ
డఆయ
డ௡
> 0 , డఆభ
డ௤
డఆమ
డ௡
డఆయ
డఙ
− డఆభ
డఙ
డఆమ
డ௡
డఆయ
డ௤
− డఆభ
డ௤
డఆమ
డఙ
డఆయ
డ௡
< 0 . Applying Cramer’s rule to 
(A4) yields 
   ௗ௪
ௗ௄
= ቀడఆభ
డ௤
డఆమ
డ௡
డఆయ
డ௄
− డఆభ
డ௄
డఆమ
డ௡
డఆయ
డ௤
− డఆభ
డ௤
డఆమ
డ௄
డఆయ
డ௡
ቁ 𝛥ఆ > 0ൗ , 
   ௗ௪
ௗఙ
= ቀడఆభ
డ௤
డఆమ
డ௡
డఆయ
డఙ
− డఆభ
డఙ
డఆమ
డ௡
డఆయ
డ௤
− డఆభ
డ௤
డఆమ
డఙ
డఆయ
డ௡
ቁ 𝛥ఆ > 0ൗ . 
Partial differentiation of equations (A1) and (A3) reveals that డఆభ
డ௤
డఆయ
డఏ
− డఆభ
డఏ
డఆయ
డ௤
= 𝜃𝑞ଷ −
𝜃𝑞ଷ = 0. Applying Cramer’s rule to (A4) yields 
   ௗ௪
ௗఏ
= డఆమ
డ௡
ቀడఆభ
డ௤
డఆయ
డఏ
− డఆభ
డఏ
డఆయ
డ௤
ቁ 𝛥ఆ = 0ൗ , 
   ௗ௡
ௗఏ
= డఆమ
డ௪
ቀడఆభ
డఏ
డఆయ
డ௤
− డఆభ
డ௤
డఆయ
డఏ
ቁ 𝛥ఆ = 0ൗ . 
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